

Christian and Muslim Anti-Semitic Beliefs

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ABSTRACT One hundred Muslims and one hundred Christians were administered a battery of tests to determine the nature and extent of anti-Semitic beliefs. The two groups differed considerably in terms of rationale, level, and course of anti-Semitic beliefs. Specifically, differences may be explained via dimensions of personal and social identity. The implications for emotional development and its role in understanding prejudices are discussed.

Introduction

There is a problem that few scholars are addressing. Since 2001, a doubling of hate crimes against Jews has occurred globally (Anti-Defamation League, “Attitudes”, “Survey”; FBI, “Hate Crime”; Gallup Poll; Pew Global Attitudes; US Dept of State). The ferocity of such attacks has caused some Jews to leave key European cities for safer places.

Anti-Israeli sentiment may have fueled much of the new or resurgent anti-Semitism. Indeed, a study by the European Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency identified four dimensions of anti-Semitism: traditional Christian motifs as well as the political Right, a pro-Palestinian political Left and traditional Muslim/Arab themes. Initially suppressed, the findings of the study directly implicated immigrant Arab Muslim young males. The contrast to traditional European anti-Semitism is striking. In some European nations, Jewish disdain remains relatively low, for example, in the UK (9%), France (11%), and Germany (20%). Elsewhere, it is different. Anti-Semitism and unfavorability ratings in Arab and Muslim nations are considerably higher, ranging from 60% (Turkey) to almost 100% (Jordan) and Jordan has no Jewish citizens (Gallup Poll; Pew Global Attitudes). Attacks and hate crimes against Jews exceed those of all other religious groups (FBI, “Hate Crimes”; Human Rights First).

Calls for social scientists to investigate the upsurge in anti-Semitism have not gone unabated (Kressel). A recent survey revealed that about a third of Europeans believe that violence against Jews is due to anti-Israeli sentiment (Anti-Defamation League, “Survey”). Formerly the domain of the extreme right, anti-Israeli sentiment now includes the extreme left, involving also Palestinian sympathizing youths.

Compared to 541 anti-Semitic incidents in the UK (CST; Iganski), France recorded 970 anti-Semitic incidents in 2004—mostly threats (graffiti, intimidation), with 200 acts of direct violence. Relying on police statistics

and human rights surveys, Nonna Mayer found that for the general population anti-Semitism rates decreased, while anti-Israeli sentiment increased (34% have more sympathy for Palestinians, while 13% have more sympathy for Israelis). However, her survey which relied on police statistics was limited methodologically in that specific questions had not been asked and direct participant observation was unavailable.

Of note is a 2007 Swiss study which found anti-Semitism in approximately a third of its residents. While in line with anti-Semitism rates of most of its European neighbors, disdain was almost doubled¹. Recently, social scientists Kaplan and Small polled 5,000 Muslim and Christian respondents from ten European nations directly by telephone (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Holland, Spain, Switzerland, the UK). Among other themes, anti-Israel sentiment predicted anti-Semitism, with European Muslims nearly eightfold more likely to harbor anti-Semitic beliefs. Yet, even when anti-Israeli sentiment was statistically controlled, anti-Semitic beliefs persisted (Baum and Nakazawa). Although Kaplan and Small's sample size was unprecedented, telephone polls have limits; other techniques, such as face-to-face interviews, use of formal tests, and participant observation would have yielded more comprehensive results. To that end, direct testing of Muslim and Christian respondents was used in this study.

Currently, there are between 20 and 30 million Muslims in Western Europe; over the past 30 years, an estimated 5 million Muslims have immigrated to North America (BBC; Pryce-Jones). To date, there is no available data from a North American setting and there appear to be differences with respect to anti-Semitism and radicalism among European Union and North American Muslims. The present study was designed to assess the nature and extent of anti-Semitic beliefs among North American Christians and Muslims and to understand better the conditions that create the most lethal (Baum, *Psychology*) and enduring hate (Wistrich).

Variables

In the light of past research, a number of variables are suggested to be related to anti-Semitism—individual/group threat, authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, strength of religious group identification—and demographics are linked to anti-Semitism. Each of these factors is described below.

Personal and Social Identity

Eidelson and Eidelson propose that core beliefs are key to understanding prejudice and conflict. They identify such beliefs as *vulnerability*, *injustice*, *distrust*, *superiority*, and *helplessness*. Vulnerability is characterized by beliefs that the world is a dangerous and risky place, where individual or social group safety and security are elusive and overwhelming loss always lurks on the horizon. The injustice domain involves perceptions of mistreatment by others. Distrust focuses on the presumed hostility and malicious intent of others. The helplessness domain involves perceived inability to influence or control events and outcomes. Finally, the superiority domain is the belief that one is better than

others; such beliefs find expression in terms of entitlement, special status or moral superiority.

With the exception of the superiority belief, all four variables appear to reflect specific facets of personal and unique individual experience as well as social group (collective) identity. In general, people with this perspective view the world as hostile and perceive their identified group as unable to defend itself against hostile others. As such, holding others responsible for one's ills should produce negative attitudes toward these individuals or groups. Recently, other scholars (Konig, Eisinga and Scheepers 375) have described this "truth" as a "narrow breadth of perspective on social reality".

Personal and social identity has an impressive body of accumulated research confirming and elaborating upon its importance in intergroup attitudes and relations. Among the most prominent theoretical accounts are social identity (e.g. Tajfel; Tajfel and Turner) and self-categorization theory (e.g. Turner et al.). More recent approaches extending the reach of these formulations highlighted the significance of individual differences in the strength with which people identify with groups (e.g. Ellemers, Spears and Doosje; Perreault and Bourhis). Huddy stressed the greater importance of subjective group loyalty over mere objective group membership, including the greater likelihood of disparagement of an outgroup from high-identifiers than from low-identifiers. It seems likely that individuals who identify more strongly with their religious group should be more inclined to express disdain for members of outsider groups.

Authoritarianism

The early work on the authoritarian personality focused on a trait constellation characterized by submissiveness and glorification of leaders and was linked to general prejudice (Adorno et al.). Subsequent efforts to define more precisely and measure authoritarianism most notably included the revised construct of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). In this reformulation, Altemeyer (*Right-wing, Authoritarian*) emphasized the co-occurrence of three core components of authoritarianism—conventionalism, authoritarian aggression, and authoritarian submission—that appear central to a prejudicial and ethnocentric mindset. A wide range of empirical studies showed that RWA as an individual difference measure is indeed linked to prejudice and hostility toward outgroups (see Feldman; Martin). RWA was found to be positively correlated with some aspects of anti-Semitism (Raden), with both racial and homosexual prejudice (e.g. Laythe, Finkel and Kirkpatrick, 2001), with nationalism and generalized outgroup prejudice (e.g. Duckitt), and with the perception of the social world as dangerous and threatening (e.g. Altemeyer, *Enemies*). While some earlier studies noted a link between anti-Semitic sentiment and authoritarianism as measured by the F-scale (Himmelhoich; Radke-Yarrow and Lande), more recent work highlighted the influence of social variables, including readiness for violence, approval of National Socialism, and political agendas in those with extremist orientations (Frindte, Wettig and Wammetsberger).

Religious Fundamentalism

Scholars also emphasized the role of religiosity in promoting anti-Semitism, especially among devout members of other faiths, specifically Christianity and Islam. Both the New Testament (Baum, *Mental Disorder*) and the Koran/Hadith (Bostom) contain numerous passages condemning Jews, to which researchers suggested both a direct and indirect causal link (Glock and Stark). More recently, Konig, Eisinga and Scheepers (384) implicated trait rigidity which “makes people more prone to particularistic unfavorable images of religious outgroups”, noting that it occurs in the non-religious “narrow perspective on social reality” typical of rigidity (e.g. Laythe et al.).

General Psychopathology

While the relationship between superstition and anti-Semitism is established (Baum and Rudski), much less is known regarding other ‘psychopathologies’. Ostow observed that patients with greater psychiatric illness tended to harbor the most anti-Semitic sentiments. Consequently, general psychopathology should be examined as well.

Demographic Variables

Finally, a range of associations between anti-Semitism and various demographic variables are reported in the literature, although the findings have not always been consistent. For example, various studies have shown older respondents to be more anti-Semitic than younger ones (e.g. Bergmann and Erb), but not consistently (D’Alessio and Stolzenberg). Less formal education (e.g. Weil) and lower socio-economic status (e.g. Gibson and Duch) have also been linked to higher levels of anti-Semitism. In general, men endorse more prejudices and anti-Semitic beliefs than women (e.g. Brym and Lenton; Dunbar and Simonova), but not consistently (e.g. Martire and Clark).

All of the above variables—from personal and social identity threat to demographics—were entered as potential contributors to individual and group differences in anti-Semitism.

Method*Participants and Procedure*

The sample was collected via friendship networks and comprised 200 respondents from a large Midwest American city and a medium-size neighboring Canadian city. The sample included 100 Arab Muslims and 100 Christians. A third group of 100 Jews were included for comparative purposes. Two Arab-speaking translators administered the interview schedules to the non-Arab participants and in Arabic to the Arab respondents. The Arabic version of the interview protocol was translated and translated back to ensure that it was comparable to the English version.

The Arab translators reassured the reluctant participants that the survey was academically based, then offered an additional US\$10.00 for their participation.

Table 1. Demographic Data by Religious Group.

	Christians		Muslims		Jews	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Age	42.70	12.45	38.74	11.60	57.11	14.22
Education	4.35	0.82	3.69	1.19	5.09	0.87
Income	2.03	0.66	1.33	0.51	2.51	0.56
Years in N. America	40.95	13.73	8.76	7.71	54.30	15.78

Note: *N*s equal 94, 99, and 98 for Christians, Muslims, and Jews, respectively. In regard to gender, males represented 28.2%, 61.6%, and 47.9% of the Christian, Muslim, and Jewish samples, respectively. Education ranged from No Formal Education (1) to Post-College Degree (6). Income was divided into three levels: Lower (1), Middle (2), and Higher (3).

Initially hesitant, all respondents subsequently participated. Complete surveys were obtained from 99 Muslim and 94 Christian respondents.

Demographic data on the three samples are summarized in Table 1. Of particular note are significant differences between the Christian and Muslim samples. Compared to the Muslim sample, the Christian sample had a higher proportion of women (69% vs 39%) [$t(176) = 4.25, p < .001$], was older [$t(194) = 2.43, p = .016$], was more educated [$t(169) = 3.96, p < .001$], had a higher family income [$t(186) = 8.22, p < .001$], and had resided in North America longer [$t(184) = 19.89, p < .001$]. Almost all the Christian participants were born in North America. By contrast, only 3.1% of the Muslim participants were born in North America; the majority was born in Lebanon (55.1%), the remainder in Iraq (15.3%), Syria (9.2%), Egypt (8.2%), Gaza/West Bank (7.1%), Kuwait (1.0%), and Yemen (1.0%).

Interview Schedule

The anti-Semitism level was assessed via the Anti-Semitic Index (ASI) (Selznick and Steinberg), a popular eleven-item measure. All the items are answered on a 7-point scale, ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (7). Across the Christian and Muslim samples, this measure had a Cronbach alpha of .94, with alphas of .95 for Christians and .81 for Muslims.

Personal and Social Identity

Personal and social identity levels were determined by way of Personal World Negativity (PWN) and Group-Focused Negativity (GFN) from Eidelson's ("Multi-level Analysis") Individual-Group Belief Inventory (IGBI). The IGBI employs three-item scales to measure the belief domains of vulnerability, injustice, distrust, superiority, and helplessness. Using parallel items, each belief is measured at three different levels of analysis: (1) personal beliefs about the personal world, (2) personal beliefs about the in-group, and (3) personal perceptions of the in-group's collective worldviews. Only the first two 15-item sets were used in this study, with respondents first completing the items about their personal worlds and then, after identifying their religious group, completing the items about their in-group. All items are answered on a five-point scale,

ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5). As one example of the parallel item structure employed by the IGBI, sample items assessing the respondents' beliefs about vulnerability at the personal world and in-group levels are "My safety and security are uncertain" and "I believe my group's safety and security are uncertain", respectively. Two threat or 'negativity mindset' scales were created—one in regard to the personal world and the other in regard to the in-group—by combining the appropriate level-of-analysis items from the IGBI vulnerability, injustice, distrust, and helplessness scales. Past research using the IGBI in a variety of settings confirmed that scores on the four separate vulnerability, injustice, distrust, and helplessness scales tend to be positively correlated with each other (Eidelson, "Multi-level Analysis"). Given the relatively small sample sizes of this study, the four belief domains were combined into a measure reflecting a global negative view of personal or in-group world. The Cronbach alphas for the PWN and GFN scales were .92 and .97, respectively. For the two separate groups, they were .89 and .94 for the Christian sample and .91 and .93 for the Muslim sample.

Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism was measured using 20 items from Altemeyer's Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, *Authoritarianism*). Items were answered on a nine-point scale, ranging from Disagree Very Strongly (1) to Agree Very Strongly (9). The Cronbach alpha for this scale was .95 overall and .95 and .90 for the Christian and Muslim samples, respectively. This scale is also constructed from both positively scored and negatively scored items. The correlation between these subsets of the RWA items produced strong negative *rs* of $-.77$ and $-.63$ for the Christian and Muslim samples, respectively, again consistent with the absence of a response set bias of this particular type.

Religious Fundamentalism

Twelve items developed by Altemeyer and Hunsberger (*Revised*) were used to measure religious fundamentalism. Items were answered on a nine-point scale, ranging from Disagree Very Strongly (1) to Agree Very Strongly (9). The Cronbach alpha for this scale was .93 overall and .93 and .90 for the Christian and Muslim samples, respectively. As this scale is constructed from both positively scored and negatively scored items, the correlation between these two subsets of items served as an indirect measure of possible response sets among the participants. The correlation between the positively scored and negatively scored Fundamentalism item subsets was calculated and produced strong negative *rs* of $-.78$ and $-.65$ for the Christian and Muslim samples, respectively, consistent with the absence of a response set bias of this particular type.

Psychopathology

The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Revised (EPQ-R) is a 57-item true/false shortened version of the more extensive Eysenck Personality Test. The EPQ-R

contains three scales designed to measure extraversion/introversion, neuroticism, and psychoticism. High extraversion scores describe individuals who are outgoing, impulsive, uninhibited, have many social contacts, and often participate in group activities. By contrast, introverts tend to be quiet, retiring, studious, reserved and distant, except with intimate friends. High neuroticism scores indicate strong emotional lability and over activity. Such individuals tend to be emotionally over-responsive and encounter difficulties in calming themselves. They report anxieties and irritating emotional feelings, but function adequately in the family and work situation. Individuals scoring high on the psychoticism scale tend to be hostile and to lack empathy. They can also be inhumane, socially indifferent, insular, intolerant and belittling, and disruptive toward others. Validity and reliability for the EPQ-R have been established elsewhere (Caruso et al.).

Group Identification

The measure of strength of identification with the religious group was based on six items adapted from Brown et al., constructed on a five-point Likert-type scale, ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5). The Cronbach alpha for this scale was .94 overall and .90 and .93 for the Christian and Muslim samples, respectively.

Results

Our primary focus involved comparisons between the Christian and Muslim samples with regard to level of anti-Semitism and its underlying correlates. In addition to t-tests assessing mean religious group differences, zero-order correlations were calculated and a series of regression analyses were conducted to determine the unique contributions of the specific predictor variables in explaining anti-Semitism in Christians and Muslims. Four key demographic variables—age, gender, education, and income—were included in many of the analyses. Dummy-coded variables were created for religious group (0 for Christians and 1 for Muslims) and for gender (0 for males and 1 for females). All other measures were treated as continuous variables.

Mean Differences among Samples

Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations for the key measures separately for the Muslim, Christian, and Jewish samples, controlling for four demographic variables (age, gender, education, and income). Muslims scored significantly higher than Christians on anti-Semitism [$t(187) = 9.92, p < .001$] and Jews lowest, but it is noteworthy that this difference with the Christian sample fell just short of significance [$t(186) = 1.88, p = .062$]. The Muslim sample also scored significantly higher than the Christian sample on both Personal World Negativity (PWN) [$t(187) = 5.50, p < .001$] and even more so on Group-Focused Negativity (GFN) [$t(187) = 11.41, p < .001$]; thus, Muslims viewed both their personal and collective circumstances as more adverse than their Christian counterparts did. On both these key predictor variables, Jews scored in between Muslims and Christians. On Personal World Negativity

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Samples.

	Christians		Muslims		Jews	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Anti-Semitism	2.36	1.11	4.15	0.90	2.05	0.66
Personal World Negativity	2.04	0.71	2.77	0.74	2.20	0.62
Group-Focused Negativity	1.68	0.77	3.36	0.84	3.19	0.83
Extraversion	7.44	3.36	7.13	3.06	7.97	3.50
Neuroticism	4.94	3.71	6.74	2.43	6.07	3.14
Psychoticism	2.46	1.96	4.32	2.79	2.37	1.83
Strength of Group Identification	2.41	1.02	3.81	0.97	4.05	0.79
Religious Fundamentalism	4.27	2.00	5.57	1.35	2.84	1.25
Right-Wing Authoritarianism	3.86	1.77	5.39	1.20	3.23	1.42

Note: *N*s equal 94, 99, and 98 for Christians, Muslims, and Jews, respectively. The means are adjusted to control for the age, gender, education, and income covariates.

(Personal Identity), Jews were similar to their Christian counterparts [$t(186) = 1.36$, $p = .175$] and quite different from Muslims [$t(191) = 4.79$, $p < .001$]. Concerning Social Identity/Group-Focused Negativity, Jews were similar to Muslims [$t(191) = 1.10$, $p = .272$] and significantly different from the Christian sample [$t(186) = 10.07$, $p < .001$]. Overall, Jews shared with Christians a modest concern about their personal circumstances and shared with Muslims a much stronger concern about the circumstances facing their religious group.

Paired sample *t*-tests comparing the means for Personal Identity (Personal World Negativity) and Social Identity (Group-Focused Negativity) in each of the three samples were conducted. For the Muslims, social identity was on average significantly stronger than personal identity (PWN) [$t(98) = 6.39$, $p < .001$]. This discrepancy was even greater for the Jewish sample [$t(97) = 15.75$, $p < .001$]. By contrast, this pattern was reversed in the Christian sample: the PWN was significantly stronger than GFN [$t(93) = 3.83$, $p < .001$]. In other words, the experience reported by the Jewish sample was much more about the perceived circumstances of their socially identified group rather than their own personal lives and this was also true to a lesser extent for the Muslims. On the other hand, among the Christians, the focus was more personal and had less to do with problems facing their social group.

As Table 3 indicates, the Muslim sample scored significantly higher than their Christian counterparts on five of the six predictor measures: Fundamentalism [$t(187) = 4.78$, $p < .001$], Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) [$t(187) = 5.98$, $p < .001$], Group Identity Strength [$t(187) = 7.77$, $p < .001$], Psychoticism [$t(187) = 4.70$, $p < .001$], and Neuroticism [$t(187) = 2.79$, $p = .006$]. The difference on Extraversion was not significant [$t(187) = .13$, $p = .898$]. With respect to significant differences between Muslims and Jews on these variables, Muslims scored higher on Fundamentalism [$t(191) = 9.07$, $p < .001$], RWA [$t(191) = 7.54$, $p < .001$], Psychoticism [$t(191) = 4.67$, $p < .001$], and Neuroticism [$t(191) = 2.42$, $p = .017$], but lower on Extraversion [$t(191) = -2.20$, $p = .029$]. Both Muslims and Jews did not differ on Group Identity Strength [$t(191) = -1.26$, $p = .209$]. A comparison of the Jewish and Christian samples revealed that Jews scored higher than Christians on Group Identification [$t(186) = 9.95$, $p < .001$] and

lower on Fundamentalism [$t(186) = -4.23, p < .001$]; the two groups did not differ significantly on RWA [$t(186) = -1.68, p = .095$] or on any of the mental health measures: Psychoticism [$t(186) = -.16, p = .876$], Neuroticism [$t(186) = 1.86, p = .065$], and Extraversion [$t(186) = 1.23, p = .220$].

Correlations with Anti-Semitism in the Christian and Muslim Samples

Table 3 presents the inter-correlations among the anti-Semitism measure, the predictor variables, and the four demographic variables for the Christian and Muslim samples. Most relationships were consistent in direction across samples, although the magnitude of the relationships varied in many cases. In terms of demographic variables, income was negatively correlated with anti-Semitism in both samples. Education was also negatively correlated with anti-Semitism in the Christian sample, but it was unrelated to the criterion measure in the Muslim sample. Gender was unrelated to anti-Semitism among the Christian respondents, but in the Muslim sample, female participants were slightly more anti-Semitic than their male counterparts. Age and anti-Semitism fell short of significance in both samples.

Turning to the zero-order correlations between the predictor variables and the criterion measure, personal identity (Personal World Negativity) was positively correlated with anti-Semitism in both samples, although the relationship was significantly stronger in the Christian sample ($z = 4.20, p < .001$). Social identity (Group-Focused Negativity) was also positively correlated with anti-Semitism in both groups and the strength of the relationship did not differ significantly between the samples. However, a further comparison of the two negativity mindsets revealed a divergent pattern between samples. For Muslims, social identity (Group-Focused Negativity) was more strongly correlated with anti-Semitism than was personal identity (Personal World Negativity) [$t(96) = 4.31, p < .001$], while the opposite relationship was true for the Christians [$t(91) = 3.54, p < .001$].

The three mental health variables were all significantly correlated with anti-Semitism in the Christian sample in the anticipated directions: neuroticism and psychoticism were both associated with greater anti-Semitism, while extraversion was linked to diminished anti-Semitism. However, the pattern was substantially different in the Muslim sample. Extraversion was again negatively correlated with anti-Semitism, but neither neuroticism nor psychoticism was significantly associated with the criterion measure.

As predicted, Authoritarianism was positively correlated with anti-Semitism in both groups, at approximately comparable levels. However, while Fundamentalism was also linked to greater anti-Semitism among Muslims, this relationship fell just short of statistical significance in the Christian sample.

Finally, strength of identification with one's religious group was positively linked to anti-Semitism for Muslims and unrelated to anti-Semitism among Christians.

Regression Analyses Predicting Anti-Semitism in Christians and Muslims

To examine more fully the relationships among the predictor variables and the anti-Semitism criterion measure, a set of six regression models was examined.

Table 3. Inter-Correlations for Christian and Muslim Samples.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Anti-Semitism		.69	.40	-.30	.40	.25	.13	.18	.31	-.19	-.18	-.24	-.33
2. PWN	.23		.44	-.32	.58	.44	.05	.21	.29	-.22	-.29	-.19	-.35
3. GFN	.52	.69		-.12	.18	.08	.40	.21	.33	-.03	-.11	.12	-.03
4. Extraversion	-.28	-.26	-.24		-.13	-.03	.06	-.05	-.17	.02	.10	.12	.20
5. Neuroticism	-.06	.02	-.02	-.07		.14	-.01	.11	.16	-.10	-.14	-.26	-.35
6. Psychoticism	-.04	.47	.20	-.05	.06		-.04	-.00	.04	-.31	-.46	-.21	-.26
7. Group Identification	.41	-.16	.18	-.15	-.03	-.50		.52	.48	-.02	.02	.18	-.01
8. Fundamentalism	.29	-.11	.10	-.32	-.12	-.38	.69		.90	.08	.00	-.18	-.16
9. RWA	.38	-.16	.12	-.31	-.09	-.41	.74	.87		.00	-.03	-.22	-.19
10. Age	.10	.02	.13	-.09	-.11	-.01	.11	.20	.21		.10	.12	.19
11. Gender	.23	-.02	.16	-.08	.25	-.31	.22	.18	.15	-.02		.14	.17
12. Education	-.05	-.19	-.17	.05	-.09	-.24	.05	.09	.01	-.21	-.07		.33
13. Income	-.20	.00	-.08	.09	-.25	.23	-.26	-.06	-.19	.15	-.23	.28	

Note: *N*s equal 94 and 99 for Christians and Muslims, respectively. Correlations for the Christian sample (*N* = 94) are above diagonal; correlations for the Muslim sample (*N* = 99) are below diagonal. For $r > .33$, $p < .001$; for $r > .26$, $p < .01$; for $r > .20$, $p < .05$.
 PWN = Personal World Negativity; GFN = Group-Focused Negativity; RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism.

All models included the four demographic variables—age, gender, education, and income. Model 1 included these demographic variables only. Model 2 also included personal identity (Personal World Negativity) and social identity (Group-Focused Negativity) and the interaction term for these two measures. Model 3 included the demographic variables and the three Eysenck scales measuring psychoticism, neuroticism, and extraversion. Model 4 included the demographic variables and the measure of group identification strength. Model 5 included demographics and Right-Wing Authoritarianism. Finally, Model 6 included the entire set of predictor variables. Fundamentalism was not used as a predictor variable in any of these analyses due to its exceedingly high correlation with RWA.

Each model was examined for three different sample combinations: the Christian and Muslim respondents combined, the Christian sample separately, and the Muslim sample separately. The Jewish sample was not included in any of the regression models predicting anti-Semitism. Table 4 presents the R^2 values for each model and the standardized regression coefficients for each predictor in each of the six models for the three different data sets.

Model 1, including the four demographic variables only, explained a statistically significant proportion of the variance in the anti-Semitism measure in the Christian and Muslim groups combined [$R^2 = .32$, $F(4,188) = 22.30$, $p < .001$], and in the Christian sample [$R^2 = .16$, $F(4,89) = 4.14$, $p = .004$] and Muslim sample [$R^2 = .10$, $F(4,94) = 2.49$, $p = .048$] separately. Across the three cases, income tended to be the variable most consistently associated with anti-Semitism with those respondents who were more financially secure, tending to score lower on the criterion measure than their less wealthy counterparts.

The addition of the negativity mindset variables (Model 2) yielded a large increase in explanatory power in all three cases. In the combined sample model, R^2 was raised to .64 [$DR^2 = .32$, $F(3,185) = 54.16$, $p < .001$], accounting for nearly two-thirds of the variance in anti-Semitism scores. In this model, income remained a significant predictor and both personal (Personal World Negativity) and social identity (Group-Focused Negativity) were strongly associated with greater levels of anti-Semitism. Yet the negativity mindset variables also significantly improved the prediction of anti-Semitism in both the Christian sample [$DR^2 = 0.36$, $F(3,86) = 21.21$, $p < 0.001$] and the Muslim sample [$DR^2 = 0.30$, $F(3,91) = 15.19$, $p < 0.001$], the relationships in these single sample models differed considerably from each other.

For the Christian sample, personal identity (Personal World Negativity) was strongly linked to anti-Semitic beliefs, but social identity (Group-Focused Negativity) did not contribute significantly to the model. By contrast, it was social identity (Group-Focused Negativity) for the Muslims that was strongly associated with greater anti-Semitism and the mindset interaction term was also significant. At the same time, Personal World Negativity had a negative standardized regression weight that approached statistical significance, even though its zero-order correlation with anti-Semitism was positive, and the regression weight for Group-Focused Negativity was greater in magnitude than its zero-order correlation with the criterion measure (see Table 4). This pattern is indicative of a potential suppressor variable effect between personal (PWN) and social identity (GFN). Consequently, controlling for personal identity (PWN)

Table 4. Standardized Regression Weights and R² Values for Regression: Models and Muslims.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6						
	Demographics Only		Negativity Mindsets		Mental Health Variables		Identification Strength		Right-Wing Authoritarianism		All Predictors Combined						
	Both	C	Both	C	Both	C	Both	C	Both	C	Both	C					
Age	-.04	-.12	.15	-.02	-.04	.04	-.01	-.10	.12	-.06	-.12	.08	-.13	.05	-.04	-.12	.15
Gender	-.15	-.11	.19	-.02	.03	.06	-.05	-.04	.24	-.13	-.12	.13	-.12	.15	-.02	-.00	.08
Education	-.11	-.13	.06	-.02	-.13	.10	-.02	-.06	.09	-.14	-.16	-.01	-.08	.01	-.02	-.14	.09
Income	-.46	-.25	-.20	-.23	-.08	-.19	-.35	-.11	-.24	-.29	-.23	-.09	-.30	-.21	-.15	-.07	-.15
Personal World	-	-	-	.21	.56	-.19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.20	.59	-.13
Negativity (PWN)	-	-	-	.49	.16	.64	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.33	.11	.50
Group-Focused	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Negativity (GFN)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PWN x GFN Interaction	-	-	-	-.08	.04	.24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.02	.05	.25
Psychoticism	-	-	-	-	-	-	.22	.11	.10	-	-	-	-	-	.03	-.08	.17
Neuroticism	-	-	-	-	-	-	.19	.29	-.18	-	-	-	-	-	.06	-.02	-.06
Extraversion	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.16	-.22	-.23	-	-	-	-	-	-.06	-.07	-.07
Identification Strength	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.41	.16	.34	-	-	-.13	.08	.19
RWA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.42	.25	.14	.02	.17
Model R ²	.32	.16	.10	.64	.52	.40	.42	.29	.18	.47	.18	.20	.46	.22	.68	.53	.49

Note: Both = Christian and Muslim samples combined; C = Christian sample only; M = Muslim sample only. Ns equal 94 for the Christian sample and 99 for the Muslim sample. Entries in bold italics are statistically significant (p < .05). Cells without numerical entries represent predictor variables not used in that model.

strengthened the relationship between social identity (GFN) and anti-Semitism. Controlling for social identity (GFN) in turn altered the direction of the relationship between personal (PWN) and anti-Semitic beliefs.

Using median splits, high and low scorers among Muslim respondents revealed that anti-Semitic beliefs were weakest among those who simultaneously scored low on social identity (GFN) and high on personal identity (PWN).

Model 3 included the three mental health measures instead of the negativity mindset variables. This model was also a significant improvement over the demographics-only model (Model 1), increasing the R^2 value in the combined sample to .42, [$DR^2 = .10$, $F(3,185) = 10.54$, $p < .001$]. However, the increase in explanatory power was less than that provided by the inclusion of the negativity mindset measures. Psychoticism, neuroticism, and extraversion were also significantly linked to anti-Semitism in the anticipated directions in the combined sample model. In the Christians only model [$DR^2 = .13$, $F(3,86) = 5.31$, $p = .002$], neuroticism and extraversion remained significant predictors, but psychoticism was not. In the Muslims only model [$DR^2 = .08$, $F(3,91) = 3.17$, $p = .028$], extraversion was the only mental health variable with a statistically significant link to anti-Semitism. It should also be noted that in this sample, neuroticism, rather than being associated with heightened anti-Semitism, was instead a negative predictor of anti-Semitic beliefs, although the relationship fell just short of statistical significance.

Turning to Model 4, the inclusion of strength of religious group identification as a predictor variable significantly improved the prediction of the criterion measure in the combined sample [$DR^2 = .15$, $F(1,187) = 50.89$, $p < .001$] and in the Muslims only sample [$DR^2 = .10$, $F(1,93) = 11.58$, $p = .001$], but not in the Christians only sample [$DR^2 = .02$, $F(1,88) = 2.62$, $p = .109$]. Consequently, Muslims who identified strongly with their group were more likely to be anti-Semitic than those for whom this identity was less important.

Authoritarianism (Model 5) also proved to be a valuable predictor of anti-Semitism when added to the demographics only model. Authoritarianism significantly improved the prediction of the criterion measure in the combined sample [$DR^2 = .14$, $F(1,187) = 50.40$, $p < .001$], the Christian sample [$DR^2 = .06$, $F(1,88) = 6.57$, $p = .012$], and the Muslim sample [$DR^2 = .09$, $F(1,93) = 10.63$, $p = .002$]. In all cases, stronger authoritarian attitudes were associated with greater anti-Semitic beliefs.

Finally, Model 6 included the entire set of predictor variables and therefore enabled a comparison of their relative value as unique contributors to explaining individual differences in anti-Semitism. As Table 4 indicates, personal identity (PWN) and social identity (GFN) and their interaction proved to be the most valuable predictors of anti-Semitic beliefs, similar to the relationships described for Model 2 (i.e. negativity mindsets only). In fact, with the exception of income and RWA in the combined sample, none of the other variables made statistically significant contributions when the negativity mindsets were included in the same model.

Follow-Up Analyses

Based on the very sizable percentage of variance accounted for in the combined Christian-Muslim regression models, specifically Models 2 and 6, interest was

generated in determining additional explanatory power via a dummy-coded Religious Group dichotomous variable and the various two-way interaction terms that included this variable. Theoretically, the religious group categorical variable could capture unspecified group characteristics distinctive of Arab Muslims or White Christians (e.g. differences in religious tenets). The addition of Religious Group as a predictor variable did in fact improve Model 6, but only modestly, thus raising the total R^2 to .70 from .68 [$DR^2 = .02$, $F(1,179) = 13.23$, $p < .001$; $\beta = .26$]. The further addition of the full set of two-way interaction terms that included the Religious Group category as one of their components to this model again improved the model, lifting the total R^2 to .75 [$DR^2 = .05$, $F(7,172) = 5.44$, $p < .001$]. The only interaction that was individually significant was the interaction between Religious Group and Personal World Negativity ($\beta = -.59$, $t = -5.09$, $p < .001$).

One last analysis could determine how effectively these two variables alone could successfully classify the Christian, Muslim, and Jewish respondents into their respective religious groups. First, a discriminate function analysis was performed using personal identity (PWN) and social identity (GFN) as predictors of either Christian or Muslim religious group membership. Using prior probabilities of 48.7% and 51.3% for the Christians and Muslims, respectively, the discriminant function produced a $\chi^2(2) = 141.26$, $p < .001$, and correctly classified 86.0% of the respondents (and comparable percentages of each group), using the two mindset variables alone. A parallel analysis was then conducted in which the Jewish sample was also included. Using prior probabilities of 32.3%, 34.0%, and 33.7% for the Christians, Muslims, and Jews, respectively, the discriminant function produced a $\chi^2(4) = 270.40$, $p < .001$ and correctly classified 74.2% of the respondents (83.0% of the Christians, 67.7% of the Muslims, and 72.4% of the Jews) on the basis of their personal identity (PWN) and social identity (GFN) scores.

Discussion

Personal and social identity threat emerged as the strongest predictors of anti-Semitism in the Christian and Muslim samples—a finding consistent with other research occurring in Germany (Bergmann; Saroglou and Galand) and elsewhere. In fact, these two predictors were as effective as the Muslim-Christian distinction itself in predicting the respondents' level of anti-Semitism. At the same time, when each group was examined separately, key differences within the groups appeared. For Christians, the threat was individually mediated, with personal identity a better predictor of anti-Semitism than their religion, while for the Muslims it was social identity. The most anti-Semitic Christians perceived themselves as personally mistreated, vulnerable, and helpless. By contrast, the most anti-Semitic Muslims perceived their social and religious world to be under attack (see Eidelson, "Individual-Group").

The above finding may have important implications in terms of identity development. In this study, most Muslims evolved from collectivist cultures and are very religious, maintaining their social identities at a cost of individual and personal development (Hofstede; Triandis). Consistent with this are the findings regarding Muslims with the highest and lowest anti-Semitism scores.

The least anti-Semitic Muslims were personally identified and more developed, for example, less authoritarian, less fundamentalist, and higher functioning emotionally. These more developed Muslims did not view their religious group as facing adversity and were actually more sympathetic to Jews. The finding is consistent with the theory that those who help and rescue during a genocide are higher functioning, less racist, and emotionally developed (Baum, *Genocide*).

Combined with the finding that the Christian sample scored higher on personal identity, while the Muslim sample scored higher on group and social identity, this overall pattern suggests an intriguing distinction in explaining anti-Semitism. From a social identity perspective (Tajfel and Turner; Turner et al.), Christian anti-Semitism is more linked to issues of personal identity, whereas Muslim anti-Semitism is tied to issues of social identity. This contrast may in part also reflect the stronger identification with their religious group reported by the Muslim sample, compared to the Christian sample, and would explain why group identification was significantly positively correlated with anti-Semitism for Muslims, but not for Christians.

Intriguing as well are the findings that right-wing authoritarianism correlated with anti-Semitism in both samples. Here, too, were differences with Muslims scoring higher than Christians. Authoritarianism correlated with personal and social threat for Christians, but not among the Muslims.

There were apparent differences in level of functioning as well. Neuroticism and psychoticism predicted anti-Semitism for Christians, but not for Muslims. At the same time, Muslims scored significantly higher on both neuroticism and psychoticism. However, these two measures were unrelated to Muslim anti-Semitism. Perhaps the measure is psychometrically limited, never being standardized on a Arab/Muslim population, yet the findings suggesting that anti-Semitism in this group is much more about social than personal issues. Consistent as well with clinical research linking psychopathology and anti-Semitism (e.g. Ostow), authors of an earlier study offered a different conclusion: "a pathology is present, but it is in the beliefs, not necessarily the individual who accepts them" (Selznick and Steinberg 190).

The social beliefs of a nation may well be pathological—or like superstitions, fanciful and silly. However, when such social beliefs turn political and are supported by a state's religion, its government, and the popular culture, it seems likely that the average person comes to accept the superstitious beliefs as real and one day, given the right conditions, may act on those beliefs (Baum, *Psychology of Anti-Semitism*).

Some Considerations

The limitations of this study should also be taken seriously. As the data were obtained through friendship networks, representative samples of Arab Muslims may not have been attained. Recently immigrated Arab Muslims may be directly involved in the Middle-East conflict and harbor more anti-Israeli resentment than those established elsewhere. Samples imbalance of age and gender, of immigrant verses the North American Christians (who have resided in North America all their lives) may not be comparable.

There is also some concern regarding the range of American Muslims compared to the Arab Muslim subjects. While there were several cultural differences

among Muslims, no significant differences occurred (Shia v Sunni $p < ns$). In fact, anti-Semitism rates did not decline with length of time residing in North America—indeed, there were slight increases.²

Context is equally important to consider. For instance, the survey was conducted shortly after the 7/7 bombings of London in 2005 and the backdrop of violence may have polarized views, increasing the anti-Israeli sentiment and anti-Semitism ratings among Muslim youth, as has been noted elsewhere (Mayer).

Further, little attempt is made to show how anti-Semitism differs from anti-Muslim or anti-Christian sentiment. It does not. Such sentiments in Jews were not measured, as Jewish populations are more endangered since 2001, reflected in hate crimes, and for the most part, perpetration of hate crimes by Jews to other groups is almost nil (FBI.gov; Iganski). Future studies may wish to examine the nature and extent of anti-Muslim and anti-Christian prejudices among Jews and why there are limited hate crimes.

Causal relationships should not be inferred based on correlational findings. However, there are two considerations. Of particular note are the relationships uncovered with regard to the personal and social group mindsets. As mentioned, these mindsets combine the vulnerability, injustice, distrust, and helplessness domains and were strongly correlated with anti-Semitism in both samples. Muslims scored significantly higher than Christians on both of these measures, suggesting that the Muslim respondents perceived greater personal and religious group threat than Christians. These discrepancies are further clarified when the scores of the Jewish sample are considered: the Jewish respondents were comparable to the Christian sample in their modest level of personal threat and comparable to the Muslim sample in their group threat. Consequently, the Jewish comparison group was similar to Christians and Muslims, respectively. At the same time, one cannot rule out the possibility that unmeasured factors have causal influence on both the predictors and on anti-Semitism. While it is difficult to envision an experimental design that would allow for conclusive proof, it is our belief that the predictor variables chosen have direct causal links to anti-Semitism levels.

Another limitation is that efforts to measure anti-Semitic beliefs were overt. Consequently, some respondents may have answered in ways that do not truly reflect their opinions, which may have accounted for some of the very large mean differences in anti-Semitism scores. If, in fact, overt hostility toward Jews is more acceptable in Arab Muslims than in Christians, some part of that very large difference between groups may reflect the greater restraint among the latter respondents. On the other hand, it may not. The following response was typical. 19% of Arab Muslims agreed with the item “Jews are inherently more evil”; by contrast, 13% of non-Arab Muslims agreed, while Arab Christians’ rates of endorsement were almost half (10%). Parenthetically, no (0%) of the Christians from North America endorsed this item.

Another area of uncertainty in our findings lies in the possible fusion of ethnicity and religious group identification, particularly within our Arab Muslim sample. For instance, respondents were asked on several occasions whether their ‘group’ was treated fairly. Those from collectivist cultures may have had difficulty separating ethnic, cultural, and religious group differences, because, like social and personal identity, those boundaries appear fused.

Finally, our comparison of anti-Semitism in Christian and Muslim samples explored a variety of domains, but it did not directly examine the role of differences in, for example, culture (Hofstede; Triandis), development (Baum, *Psychology of Anti-Semitism, Mental Order*), superstitious beliefs (Baum and Rudski), immigrant status (Saroglou and Galand) or majority-minority dimensions (e.g. Verkuyten).

Nonetheless, preliminary evidence reported here strongly suggests that the psychological underpinnings of anti-Semitism in North American Christians and Muslims differs significantly from one group to another and implicates personal and social identity and the accompanying beliefs. It may well be the acceptance of certain (anti-Semitic) social beliefs and the lack of personal development that points us toward the perpetuation of anti-Semitism in the world today.

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NOTE

1. A recent Swiss study found that 10% of the survey are ardent anti-Semites and another 27% are mildly to moderately anti-Semitic, in line with other nations. The Swiss believe that Israel is a state like any other (68%) and part of the Western world (58%), although half of the population (50%), think that Israel is carrying out a war of extermination (34% equate Israel's acts with those perpetrated by the Nazis) and 54% believe that Israel is governed by religious fanatics. The poll also revealed that 58% agree with the statement that 'Israel is the pawn of the USA' and hold Israel partially responsible for global terrorism (43%). A hardened 13% deny Israel's right to exist and 40% agree with the statement that Israel has too much power in world politics. (See Criticism against Israel is not identical with Anti-Semitic Attitudes 2007, http://www.gfsber.ch/pub/WIK%20_def_eng.pdf, access date 7 March 2009).
2. Frequency of contact lowered anti-Semitic beliefs $r = -.20$ $p < .05$ for Arab Christians (45%), compared to Non-Arab Muslims (37%), Arab Muslims (27%), and North Americans (20%), but length of time residing in a community was related to greater anti-Semitism ($r = -.36$ $p < .05$) (Baum and Nakazawa, 2005)

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